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LAW AND ORDER ON THE WILD, WILD WEST (WWW)
Jeffrey J Look*
I. INTRODUCTION
In an article I wrote about two years ago, I compared the virtual world
of the Internet to the old west of the late nineteenth century.' During much
of the 1990s, the Internet was like the old west. There were those who saw,
and many who still see, the Internet as a wide expanse of land that should be
free for anyone to exploit in any manner one sees fit even if it means using
the name and reputation of another to promote or drive traffic to their place
in cyberspace. Others, however, want some measure of control over how
their intellectual property, including their names, marks, and reputations, are
used. Until the beginning of this decade, the tools to help intellectual prop-
erty owners effectively control the infringing uses of their names, marks,
and reputations were not fully adequate. However, like Wyatt Earp and his
brothers riding into town to bring order to chaos, Congress and the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)2 stepped in to give
intellectual property owners additional weapons to control infringers, while
at the same time providing a procedure that would guard against the larger,
stronger intellectual property owner unfairly using that muscle to take away
domain names from smaller, legitimate users. Those new tools are the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)3 and the Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).4
While other, more traditional tools are still available to use in domain
name disputes, such as claims of traditional trademark infringement under
the Lanham Act,5 claims under federal6 or state trademark dilution statutes,7
* Jeffrey J. Look is a trademark attorney in Dallas, Texas. He is a graduate of the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law and a former trademark examining
attorney for the United States Patent and Trademark Office in Washington, D.C.
1. Jeffrey J. Look, The Virtual Wild, Wild West (WWWP): Intellectual Property Issues in
Cyberspace-Trademarks, Service Marks, Copyrights, and Domain Names, 22 U. ARK.
LITLE ROCK L. REv. 49 (1999).
2. ICANN is a technical coordination body for the Internet. The non-profit corporation
has responsibility for "[Internet protocol], address space allocation, protocol parameter as-
signment, domain name system management, and root system server management fumc-
tions." ICANN, About ICANN, at http://www.icann.org/general/abouticann.htn (last updated
Apr. 17, 2002).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2000).
4. ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.
icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last updated May 17, 2002) [hereinafter ICANN,
Resolution Policy].
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
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and common law unfair competition, the purpose of this article is to focus
primarily on how the ACPA and the UDRP have been used in the roughly
two years since their implementation.
II. FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN
NAMES
The primary purpose of a trademark or service mark is to identify and
distinguish the goods and services of one producer or provider of services
from those of another.8 In order for one to have a valid and enforceable
mark, one must necessarily use it for this purpose. If a mark is not used to
identify the source of goods and services to consumers, there is no trade-
mark or service mark to enforce. 9
It is also a well established concept under traditional trademark and un-
fair competition law that, in determining whether the mark of one party has
been infringed by a mark used by a competitor, there must be a considera-
tion of several factors to determine the likelihood of confusion between the
marks.' 0 One key factor in analyzing the likelihood of confusion between
7. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-71-213 (LEXIS Repl. 2001).
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Under the Lanham Act, a trademark is defined as:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof (1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manu-
factured or sold by others and to indicate [their source].
Id. A service mark is designed "to identify and distinguish the services of one person, includ-
ing a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services,
even if that source is unknown." Id.
9. See generally United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918);
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), superseded by statute as stated in
Foxtrap, Inc. v. Foxtrap, Inc., 671 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 311 (1871).
10. See In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361-62 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
In determining the likelihood of confusion, the Fifth Circuit has employed the "digits of
confusion" test. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 257 (5th Cir. 1997),
overruled on other grounds by Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23
(2001).
The factors to be weighed in this calculus include (1) similarity of the two prod-
ucts; (2) identity of retail outlets and purchasers; (3) identity of advertising me-
dia; (4) strength of the trademark or trade dress; (5) intent of the defendant; (6)
similarity of design; (7) actual confusion; and (8) degree of care employed by
consumers.
Id.; Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1989). The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the decisions of its predecessor court, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. Therefore, the PTO follows the test announced in In re E.I.
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marks involves the relationship between the goods or services of the par-
ties." If there are significant differences between the nature of the goods
and services, then greater similarity between the marks of the parties would
be permissible. 12 If the goods and services are very disparate, then even
identical marks can be used with no likelihood of consumer confusion.'
3
Furthermore, there is no requirement that the defendant have any actual
intent to infringe another's mark in order to be found guilty of infringe-
ment.'4 While a defendant's willful and deliberate intent to infringe a mark
is certainly relevant to an award of damages or attorney's fees,' 5 courts can
still enjoin those who are innocently infringing from using the infringing
mark. 16
The primary technical function of domain names is to identify a single
location on the World Wide Web. Unlike trademarks, there is no require-
DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361. This test considers:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appear-
ance, sound, connotation and commercial impression; (2) [t]he similarity or dis-
similarity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or
registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in use; (3) [t]he similar-
ity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; (4) [t]he
conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e., "impulse" vs.
careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) [t]he fame of the prior mark (sales, adver-
tising, length of use); (6) [t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on
similar goods; (7) [t]he nature and extent of any actual confusion; (8) [t]he
length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use
without evidence of actual confusion; (9) [t]he variety of goods on which a mark
is or is not used (house mark, "family" mark, product mark); (10) [t]he market
interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark... ; (11) It]he extent
to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its
goods; (12) [t]he extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or sub-
stantial; [and] (13) [a]ny other established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id. In the Eighth Circuit the test for determining likelihood of confusion includes the follow-
ing factors: (1) the strength of the trademark; (2) the similarity between the parties' marks;
(3) the competitive proximity of the parties' products; (4) the alleged infringer's intent to
confuse; (5) evidence of actual confusion; and (6) the degree of care reasonably expected of
potential consumers. Duluth News-Tribune v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th
Cir. 1996); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994).
11. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE,
TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1207.01(a)(i) (2d ed. 1993, rev. vol.
1997).
12. See id.
13. See id.; Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Handy Boys, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156,
1158 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 1990).
14. See Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc.,' 750 F.2d 903, 915 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
15. 15U.S.C.§§ 1114(1), 1117(2000).
16. See, e.g., Nalpac, Ltd. v. Coming Glass Works, 784 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1986); Ban-
dag, 750 F.2d at 903; Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Consumers Co. of Ill., 169 F.2d 153 (7th
Cir. 1948).
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ment that domain names actually be used. Furthermore, many of the statu-
tory bars to registration of a trademark 17 do not apply to domain name regis-
tration. 8 Domain names can be highly descriptive or generic, i.e.,
"www.lawfirm.com" or "www.usedcars.com." Domain names can be sur-
names or geographic in nature. Many companies naturally want to use their
trademarks and service marks as domain names because people searching
the web for a particular company's web site or products will logically and
instinctively use the company's name, trademarks, or service marks to run
the search. If the company's business is primarily conducted over the Inter-
net, having the same trademark and domain name is critical. As discussed
above, there can be multiple users of the same trademark, but only one per-
son can use any particular domain name. Furthermore, there is no require-
ment that the domain name registrant have actual trademark rights in the
name in order to register it. Because of these fundamental differences be-
tween domain name use and trademark use, conflicts often arise between
those who own the domain name registration and trademark owners.
III. TAMING THE VIRTUAL WILD, WILD WEST
Prior to the effective dates of the ACPA and the UDRP, the legal tools
available for dealing with conflicts between trademark owners and domain
name registrants were not fully adequate. Until May 1999, Network Solu-
tions, Inc. (NSI) was the only official domain name registrar in the United
States.19 NSI established a domain name dispute policy and placed it in the
standard registration agreement to which all domain name registrants con-
sented when registering their name. z0 When domain name registration was
expanded to multiple registrars, many of the new registries simply adopted
the NSI dispute policy. With regard to the old domain name dispute resolu-
tion policy, there was a requirement for substantially exact matches between
the trademark registration and the domain name.2 l If there were any minor
differences, such as extra words in the domain name or the trademark regis-
17. The statutory bars to federal trademark registration can be found in section 2 of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000). Included among the statutory bars are marks which
are merely descriptive and misdescriptive; marks which are geographically descriptive or
deceptively geographically misdescriptive; marks which are confusingly similar to other
registered marks; and marks which are scandalous, offensive, deceptive, create false associa-
tions with, or are disparaging of persons, institutions, and beliefs. See id.
18. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir.
2000).
19. See id.
20. The details of the old dispute policy are chronicled in my prior law review article.
Look, supra note 1.
21. See id. at 61-62; Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp.
949 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
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tration, even if the words were generic, then there was no substantial simi-
larity. Another difficulty was the usefulness of the "cease and desist" letter
requirement stating that the letters had to be sent to NSI's "whois.net ' 22
address of record. Many domain name registrants used false addresses or
failed to supply forwarding addresses if they moved, so cease and desist
letters that were sent would often come back unclaimed. NSI would then
decline to impose the policy because there was no proof that the registrant
had received the notice. Some trademark owners would actually track down
the domain name owner, serve them with a cease and desist letter, prove
they served it--maybe even with a written response from the domain name
owner---and NSI would still refuse to impose the policy because the ad-
dresses were not the same as in its whois.net database.
It was frustrating to people, particularly to famous entertainers and ath-
letes, who did not have federal trademark registrations for their names. A
person without a federal trademark registration could not take advantage of
the policy at all, regardless of how famous or well known he or she was. On
the other hand, conflicts often arose between large, well-funded companies
and individuals who could take advantage of their deep pockets in weeding
out someone who might have had a legitimate right to use a similar or even
identical name.23 There was also a penalty for filing a lawsuit prior to taking
advantage of the dispute policy. 24 If the complainant failed to follow all the
dispute policy steps before filing a lawsuit, the cybersquatter could submit a
copy of the complaint to NSI and keep the domain name active during the
pendency of the dispute.25
A. A New Sheriff Rides into the Wild, Wild West: The New Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)
In an effort to improve the domain name dispute process and standard-
ize it among multiple registries, ICANN developed and implemented the
22. "Whois.net" is a domain based research service containing the name, address, and
technical information of each domain name registrant.
23. For example, if the domain name was "alanjackson.com" and the registrant, actually
named Alan Jackson, was a small town school teacher using the name for a Web site he
created to post pictures of his class field trip, the country singer could use the pol-
icy--assuming he met all the initial requirements--to put the domain name on hold and
effectively take it away from the school teacher. This has been dubbed "reverse domain
name highjacking." See, e.g., Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434
RPA/PVT, 1996 WL 887734, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996) (finding toy maker Ty, Inc.
had reverse highjacked the domain name "ty.com" from a man who registered the domain
name in honor of his three-year-old son, Ty).
24. See Look, supra note 1, at 62.
25. See id.
2002]
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UDRP. The UDRP took effect on January 3, 2000,26 and all registrars in
top-level domains follow the policy.
27
1. Key Provisions of the UDRP
A domain name registrant is required to submit to a mandatory admin-
istrative proceeding in the event that a third party ("complainant") asserts to
one of the four independent dispute resolution providers:
that (i) [the registrant's] domain name is identical or confusingly similar
to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii)
[the domain name registrant has] no rights or legitimate interests in re-
spect of the domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith.28
The complainant mustprove that each of these three elements is present.29
In order to determine whether the domain name has been registered
and is being used in bad faith, the following circumstances can be used as
evidence:
* "BUY IT FROM ME OR I WILL SELL IT TO YOUR
COMPETITOR"
Circumstances indicating that the domain name registrant has registered
or has acquired the domain name:
primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transfer-
ring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that
complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of [the regis-
trant's] documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the do-
main name; or3°
S"I AM A JERK AND I AM NOT GOING TO LET YOU USE THE
NAME PERIOD"
The domain name registrant has "registered the domain name in order to
prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the
mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that [the domain name
registrant has) engaged in a pattern of such conduct"31 (e.g., has regis-
tered numerous domains for this purpose in the past); or
26. ICANN, Approved Process for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
at http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/provider-approval-process.htm (last updated Feb. 5,
2002).
27. ICANN, Resolution Policy, supra note 4.
28. Id. para. 4(a) (emphasis added).
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. para. 4(b)(i).
31. Id. para. 4(b)(ii) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 24
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e "I DO NOT LIKE YOU AND I AM GOING TO MESS WITH YOUR
BUSINESS"
The domain name registrant has "registered the domain name primarily
for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or'
32
9 "I AM GOING TO PROMOTE MY OWN STUFF USING YOUR
NAME AND REPUTATION"
[Bly using the domain name, [the domain name registrant has] in-
tentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users
to [its] web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of
confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsor-
ship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the] web site or location or of a
product or service on [the] web site or location.33
Under the new dispute policy, domain name registrants who are served
with a complaint can use any of the following defenses to demonstrate
"good faith" or legitimate interests in the domain name and thereby defeat
the complaint and keep the domain name:
34
* "I DID NOT KNOW THIS WAS YOUR NAME/MARK"
If before any notice to the domain name registrant of the dispute, the
domain name registrant can demonstrate "preparations to use the domain
name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a
bona fide offering of goods or services; or'
35
e "THIS IS MY REAL NAME TOO"
The domain name registrant "has been commonly known by the domain
name," either as a given name or a nickname, even if it has "acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or
36
* "FAIR USE"
The domain name registrant is "making a legitimate noncommercial or
fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to mis-
leadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at
issue." 37
The only remedy available under the new domain name dispute policy
is the cancellation or the transfer of the domain name registration to the
complainant. 38 Damages, attorney's fees, and/or injunctions are not avail-
able through the ICANN mandatory administrative proceeding.39
32. Id. para. 4(b)(iii).
33. ICANN, Resolution Policy, supra note 4, para. 4(b)(i)-(iv).
34. Id. para. 4(c).
35. See id. para. 4(c)(i).
36. See id. para. 4(c)(ii).
37. Id. para. 4(c)(iii).
38. Id. para. 4(i).
39. ICANN, Resolution Policy, supra note 4.
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If an administrative panel decides that a respondent's domain name
registration should be canceled or transferred, the registry will not take any
action for ten business days after it receives notice of the decision.4 0 The
purpose of the delay is to give the respondent a chance to file a lawsuit to
stop the action.4' If the panel receives official documentation indicating that
a suit has been filed, then no further action is taken until the domain name
registry receives evidence satisfactory to the organization (i) of a resolution
between the parties; (ii) that the lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn;
or (iii) of a copy of an order from a court dismissing the lawsuit or ordering
that the respondent does not have the right to continue to use the disputed
42domain name.
2. The Four Dispute Providers
The administrative proceedings are currently conducted by one of four
providers.43 The providers are the eResolution Consortium (eRES), the Na-
tional Arbitration Forum (NAF), the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO), and the Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute
Resolution (CPR).44
Since implementation of the policy two years ago, there have been
thousands of disputes handled by the various providers. For example, 3656
cases have been filed with WIPO since the implementation of the UDRP.4
The NAF has handled 2030 UDRP cases. 46 eRES has handled 346 cases,
47
and CPR, the newest dispute provider, has handled 41 cases.
48
The main advantage of using the UDRP over filing a lawsuit is that it
can generally provide an inexpensive and quick resolution for domain name
disputes. Because there is no discovery process and no absolute right to file
endless replies and subreplies after the initial filing of the complaint and
response,49 the costs of a UDRP proceeding can be much less than seeking a
40. Id. para. 4(k).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
at http://www.icann.orgludrp/approved-providers.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2002).
44. Id.
45. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Case Results. gTLDs, at http://arbiter.
wipo.int/domains/statistics/results.html (last visited May 23, 2002).
46. National Arbitration Forum, Domain Name Dispute Proceedings and Decisions, at
http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions.asp (last visited May 23, 2002).
47. Resolution Consortium, Domain Name Administrative Decisions, at http://
www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions.htm (last updated Dec. 28, 2001).
48. CPR, Dispute Resolution for Internet Domain Names-Cases and Published Deci-
sions, at http://www.cpradr.org/ICANNCases.htm (last visited May 23, 2002).
49. ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Rule 12, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter
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preliminary injunction in court. However, using the UDRP effectively re-
quires thorough advance preparation, investigation, and research. The dif-
ference between winning and losing a UDRP proceeding depends on how
much evidence a complainant or respondent can submit in support of his or
her respective positions with his or her single brief to the panel deciding the
case. Not every case is right for a UDRP proceeding. Filing under the
UDRP is ideal, however, in cases where the respondent has not actually
created a Web site, where no imminent need exists to stop active trademark
infringement, dilution, or to pull the plug on pornography, and where the
client will be satisfied with a transfer of the domain name.
3. Star-Studded UDRP Cases
Numerous celebrities have used the UDRP to successfully obtain trans-
fers of Internet domain names from cybersquatters. Examples of celebrities
who have used the UDRP to get back their names are Julia Roberts, Sade,
Celine Dion, Julie Brown, and Madonna.50 Celebrities who lost their UDRP
cases include former Police lead singer Gordon Sumner ("Sting"), Bruce
Springsteen, and the Backstreet Boys. 5' How did Sting, Bruce Springsteen,
and the Backstreet Boys lose when Julia Roberts, Sade, Celine Dion, and
Madonna all managed to prevail? It was not based on the sex of the com-
plainant, although from a cursory glance of the case names it would appear
that way. In Sting's case, the respondent, Michael Urvan, was successful in
large part because of the documentation submitted with his response. 52 Ur-
van successfully showed: (1) that he personally was using "Sting" as a
nickname and cyberidentity well before registering the sting.com domain
name;53 (2) the word "sting" had a common English language meaning, i.e.,
ICANN, Rules].
50. See, e.g., Dion v. Burgar, No. D2000-1838 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001),
available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1838.html;
Roberts v. Boyd, No. D2000-0210 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-021O.html; Adu v. Quantum
Computer Serv., Inc., No. D2000-0794 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0794.html; Ciccone v.
Parisi, No. D2000-0847 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html.
51. Springsteen v. Jeff Burgar & Bruce Springsteen Club, No. D2000-1532, para. 7
(World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/do-
mains/decisions/htmI/2000/d2000-1532.html; Backstreet Boys Prod., Inc. v. Zuccarini, No.
D2000-1619, para. 7.1 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1619.html; Sumner v.
Urvan, No. D2000-0596, para. 7.2 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d-2000-0596.html.
52. See Sumner, No. D2000-0596, para. 5.7.
53. See id. para. 6.5.
2002]
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"to prick painfully" or the act of stinging such as what a bee does, as well as
a slang term for undercover police investigations; 54 (3) the respondent,
unlike many of the other respondents involving celebrity names, did not
own a large number of Internet domain names other than sting.com; 55 and
(4) although Sting's complaint indicated that Urvan responded to an offer
from Sting to buy the domain for $25,000, there was no evidence submitted
with the complaint documenting the alleged offer and response. 6 The panel
stated further that even if the respondent did allow Sting to buy the domain
name, this fact alone was not proof that when Urvan registered the
sting.com domain name that he did so primarily for purposes of holding the
domain name hostage. 7
Contrast the Sting case with the Madonna case.58 The respondent in the
Madonna case showed that "Madonna" had a specific English language
meaning, i.e., a reference to the Virgin Mary, mother of Jesus Christ. 59
However, the respondent had not attempted to tie the Web site into anything
remotely related to the Virgin Mary. 60 Instead, the Web site featured sexu-
ally explicit materials. 61 The respondent had also registered numerous other
celebrity names.62 Finally, when asked to transfer the domain name to the
singer, he responded by demanding a fee of $20,000.63
In the case of the Backstreet Boys, the complaint was filed in the name
of Backstreet Boys Productions, Inc., a Florida corporation.64 However,
federal trademark registrations for Backstreet Boys trademarks listed Back-
street Boys Productions, Inc., a Delaware corporation, as the owner of the
mark.65 There was nothing in the record explaining why the corporation that
filed the complaint had any standing to assert it. Thus, the complaining
party failed to get out of the gate in establishing the first element of a bad
faith registration claim, namely, that the complaining party had any rights in
the mark.66
54. Id. paras. 6.5-6.6.
55. See id. para. 5.10.
56. Id. para. 6.10.
57. Id. para. 6.8.
58. Compare Sumner, No. D2000-0596 with Ciccone v. Parisi, No. D2000-0847 (World
Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0847.html.
59. See Ciccone, No. D2000-0847, para. 4.
60. Id. para. 6(C).
61. Id. para. 6(D).
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Backstreet Boys Prods., Inc. v. Zuccarini, No. D2000-1619, para. 1.1 (World Intel-
lectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-1619.html.
65. Id. para. 4.6.
66. Id. para. 6.2(2).
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Perhaps the most difficult celebrity case to understand, and the one that
provides a beacon for other cyberpirates to emulate, is the Bruce Spring-
steen case.6 7 In the Bruce Springsteen case, the administrative arbitration
panel began by acknowledging that Bruce Springsteen "is the famous, al-
most legendary, recording artist and composer., 68 However, the majority
found that Bruce Springsteen failed to establish that he had acquired "sec-
ondary meaning" in the name.69 The respondent in this case was the same
respondent as in the Celine Dion case. 70 He had registered more than 1500
celebrity domain names and then pointed visitors of these sites to a Web site
he operated under the domain name and mark "Celebrityl000.com."' 71 The
panel faulted Bruce Springsteen for the conclusory and unsubstantiated as-
sertion that the respondent had no rights in the name "Bruce Springsteen.
'72
The panel also noted that if someone searched "Bruce Springsteen" on a
search engine or web browser, thousands of Web sites would be returned."
The panel found it difficult to understand how the respondent's domain
name registration unfairly diverted traffic from Bruce Springsteen's official
Web site operated under the domain name "brucespringsteen.net. '' 74 Addi-
tionally, there was no evidence put forward showing that the respondent had
attempted to sell or otherwise transfer the domain name for any price. 75 The
panel also noted that because Bruce Springsteen already had a domain name
registration, the fact that the respondent had the "brucespringsteen.com"
domain name did not prevent the singer from using his personal name as a
corresponding domain name.76 The panels in the Celine Dion and Julie
Brown cases, which involved the same cybersquatter, Jeff Burgar, criticized
the Bruce Springsteen panel for its very narrow interpretation of what is
meant by "preventing the complainant from using the corresponding domain
67. Springsteen v. Jeff Burgar & Bruce Springsteen Club, No. D2000-1532 (World
Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1532.html.
68. Id. para. 4.
69. Id. para. 6. Secondary meaning is typically required under the Trademark Act for
merely descriptive marks as well as marks which are primarily merely surnames. See 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000). However, when a full name is used, e.g., "Bruce Springsteen," it is
neither merely descriptive of the goods or services, nor is it primarily merely a surname.
Furthermore, how can one be both "famous and almost legendary" without having acquired
some significant degree of distinctiveness?
70. Dion v. Burgar, No. D2000-1838 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1838.html.
71. Springsteen, No. D2000-1532, para. 5.
72. See id. para. 6.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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name in connection with its Web site.",77 Burgar's registration of the celeb-
rity names prevented the celebrities from using the name in the coveted
".com" top level domain, notwithstanding the fact that the celebrities in-
volved could have or did have their names registered in other top level do-
main designations such as ".net" or ".org.
' 78
Celebrities are not the only complainants that have suffered inconsis-
tent treatment by differing UDRP panels. Another incident of inconsistency
involved NBA Properties, the exclusive licensing division of the National
Basketball Association.79 In two UDRP cases, one involving "knicks.com"
and the other involving "washingtonwizards.com," NBA Properties was
unsuccessful in seeking transfer of the "knicks.com" domain name, 80 but
successful in obtaining the "washingtonwizards.com" domain name.81 In the
Knicks case, NBA Properties alleged that it was the exclusive licensee of
the Knicks trademarks, which were owned by other parties.82 However, the
panel found that the record failed to show that NBA Properties had rights in
the Knicks marks, noting that the complainant, as a licensee, had "contract
rights with respect to, not in, the licensed marks. 83 The panel went on to
state that the UDRP is believed "to envision a transfer of a disputed domain
name to a complainant/trademark owner as a route to unification of control
over the uses of the domain name and the trademark., 84 It further held that
transferring the domain name to NBA Properties, the licensee, "would place
ownership of the domain name in an entity other than the trademark owner
without consent from the trademark owner." 85 Another interesting aspect of
the Knicks case is that the respondent failed to even file a response.86 The
panel said that it would not infer bad faith intent to register with mere con-
clusory allegations in the complaint that the domain name registrant did not
have rights in the domain name, that the domain name was registered in bad
77. See Brown v. Julie Brown Club, No. D2000-1628, para. 6(2) (World Intellectual
Prop. Org. 2001), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/
d2000-1628.html; Dion v. Burgar, No. D2000-1838, para. 6(3) (World Intellectual Prop.
Org. 2001), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htm/2000/d2000-
1838.html.
78. Brown, No. D2000-1628, para. 6(2); Dion, No. D2000-1838, para. 6(3).
79. See NBA Props., Inc. v. Adirondack Software Corp., No. D2000-1211 (World Intel-
lectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-121 1.html; NBA Props., Inc. v. Ituralde-Kasmir, Inc., No. D2000-1620 (World
Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
htmlI/2000/d2000-1620.html.
80. Adirondack Software, No. D2000-121 1, para. 7.
81. Ituralde-Kasmir, No. D2000-1620, para. 7.
82. See Adirondack Software, No. D2000-121 1, para. 4.
83. Id. para. 6.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. para. 3.
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faith, or that the respondent otherwise had no legitimate interest in using the
"knicks.com" domain name.
87
Contrast this with the "washingtonwizards.com" domain name dispute
in which the panel never addressed the issue of NBA Properties's standing
as an exclusive licensee to file the complaint.88 The panel noted that NBA
Properties had submitted cease and desist letters with its complaint showing
that it did not authorize the respondent to use the domain name,89 and that
NBA Properties had also submitted evidence that the respondent had placed
the domain name for sale on a domain name auction Web site.90 This evi-
dence was enough, the panel said, to presume the respondent's bad faith
intent to register the "washingtonwizards.com" domain name, 9 1 which coin-
cidentally, happened about the same time in 1996 as when the Washington
Bullets changed its name to the Washington Wizards.
92
The interesting note about the Knicks and the Wizards cases is that in
the Knicks case, the panel interpreted the UDRP's phrase "a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights" 93 to require a showing of
ownership, 94 while the Wizards's panel used NBA Properties's standing to
file the complaint essentially as a given.95 It is well settled in traditional
trademark law that licensees have no ownership interest in the mark.
96
However, that rule does not mean that the licensee does not have rights in
the use of the mark. A licensee certainly has a contractual right in the use of
a mark that has been licensed to it, and a licensee has a vested interest, per-
haps as much as the owner, to see that the licensed mark is not infringed by
unrelated third parties via the Internet. It does not appear that the term
"rights" in the UDRP was intended to be limited solely to those who are the
owners of record of the marks; otherwise, the term "rights" as used in
UDRP rule three should have been replaced with "ownership interest." If a
licensee has a right to use a particular trademark, then it should be allowed
to use the UDRP to enforce that right. Nevertheless, if a trademark owner
87. Id. para. 6.
88. See NBA Props., Inc. v. Ituralde-Kasmir, Inc., No. D2000-1620, para. 6 (World
Intellectual Prop. Org. 2001), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1620.html.
89. See id. para. 4.
90. Id.
91. See id. para. 6.
92. See id. para. 4.
93. See NBA Props., Inc. v. Adirondack Software Corp., No. D2000-1211, para. 6
(World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/2000/d2000-121 1.html; ICANN, Rules, supra note 49, Rule 3.
94. See Adirondack Software, No. D2000-12 11, para. 6.
95. See generally Ituralde-Kasmir, No. D2000-1620.
96. See, e.g., U.S. Jaycees v. Phila. Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981); Hicks v. An-
chor Packing Co., 16 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1926).
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contemplates using an exclusive licensee to manage its trademark portfolio,
such as through a subsidiary or affiliated company, then the license agree-
ment should specify that the licensee may enforce instances of bad faith
domain name registration and that it may be a proper party to bring such an
action in a UDRP proceeding.
97
B. Marshall ACPA Comes to Town: The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act
The second new weapon in the arsenal against cybersquatters, the
ACPA, went into effect on November 29, 1999.98 This section covers sev-
eral features of the ACPA and the case law interpreting it.
1. Key Provisions of the ACPA
The ACPA provides that:
a person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, includ-
ing a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if,
without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that person: (i) has
a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section; and (ii) registers, traffics
in, or uses a domain name that (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive
at the time of registration of the domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to that mark; (II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at
the time of registration of the domain name, is identical... to or dilutive
of that mark.99
Bad faith is a significant element in a plaintiff's case. If the plaintiff
cannot show bad faith intent to register the domain name on the part of the
defendant, the defendant will win.100 In determining bad faith, a court may
consider the following factors:
97. In the author's opinion, a contractual provision stating that the licensee holds the
domain name in trust for the trademark owner and will transfer the domain name to the
owner when the license terminates would give the trademark owner an express contractual
right to enforce a transfer of the domain name from the licensee. Further, either the license
agreement in its entirety or at least the relevant portion of the license agreement should be
attached as an annex to the UDRP complaint just in case there is any question about whether
the exclusive licensee has the standing to file the complaint on behalf of the trademark
owner.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
99. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A). See generally id. § 1129 (2000).
100. See Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding
no bad faith where junior user of "Chambord" mark for use in connection with coffee and tea
makers registered the domain name "chambord.com" before senior user of "Chambord"
mark used in connection with coffee); Greenpoint Fin. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
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(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the [domain
name registrant] in the domain name; (II) the extent to which the domain
name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person; (III) the person's prior use, if
any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of
any goods or services; (IV) the person's legitimate noncommercial or
fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; (V) the
person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online loca-
tion to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confu-
sion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona
fide offering of any goods or services; . . . (VII) the person's [inten-
tional] provision of material and misleading false contact information
when applying for the registration of the domain name; . . . [(VIII) the
person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the
bona fide offering of any goods or services; and (IX)] the person's regis-
tration or acquisition of multiple domain names which.., are identical
or confusingly similar to [trademarks or service marks] of others that are
distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive
of famous trademarks or service marks of others that are famous at the
time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods
or services of such [persons] .... 101
The remedies under the ACPA include injunctive relief (such as order-
ing the defendant to transfer the domain name to the plaintiff or canceling
the domain name registration at the plaintiff's option),10 2 an award of actual
damages and the defendant's profits, or statutory damages, which can be
awarded in the court's discretion from $1000 to $100,000 per infringing
116 F. Supp. 2d 405, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no bad faith where both parties had
established trademark rights in connection with the mark "Greenpoints" for unrelated
services, and Sperry & Hutchinson Co. happened to register the domain name first); Cello
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no bad
faith where the plaintiff owned the mark "Cello" for high end audio equipment, and the
defendant registered "Cello.com" along with other names of common musical instruments
with the intent to create Web sites related to the specific musical instruments and many other
companies had trademark registrations for the same mark).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
102. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(C) (applicable to trademarks); Id. § 1129(2) (applicable to the
names of living individuals). While a plaintiff could ask for cancellation of the domain name
registration, cancellation will only make the disputed name available for someone else to
register. Therefore, asking for a transfer of the domain name is much more preferable than
cancellation.
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domain name. 103 Attorney's fees are also provided in exceptional cases.' 4
However, the ACPA provides that statutory damages are not available
against defendants who registered, trafficked in, or used the domain names
prior to the effective date of the ACPA.1
0 5
2. Court Decisions Under the ACPA
In cases involving cybersquatters who clearly registered their domain
names prior to the implementation of the ACPA, courts have treated the
award of attorney's fees, as well as the award of statutory damages, in inter-
esting ways.
In People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals (PETA) v. Doughney, 10 6
Michael Doughney registered the domain name "peta.org" which he dubbed
as "People Eating Tasty Animals."'' 0 7 PETA is, of course, well known for its
protection of animal rights, including opposition to "the exploitation of
animals for food, clothing, entertainment[,] and vivisection."'10 8 When he
registered the domain name, Doughney represented to NSI that he did so on
behalf of a nonprofit organization that did not exist. 09 Further, he had a
pattern of registering numerous domain names that were similar to the
marks used by other people and organizations.' 10 After registering the do-
main name, Doughney created a Web site under the domain name which
was billed as a "resource for those who enjoy eating meat, wearing fur and
leather, hunting, and the fruits of scientific research." '' Doughney was also
quoted in the media as saying that if PETA wanted the domain name, then it
should make him an offer." 2 Doughney contended that his Web site consti-
tuted parody protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution." 13
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's rejection of the parody defense, holding that Doughney had
used a mark substantially identical to the mark that PETA used.' 14 The court
held that parody has two elements: (i) the mark is juxtaposed simultane-
ously with an irreverent image, and (ii) the message conveys only enough of
the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point of the par-
103. Id. §§ 1117(d), 1129(2) (2000).
104. Id. § 1117(a).
105. Id. § 1117.
106. 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001).
107. Id. at 362.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 362-63.
110. See id. at 362.
111. Id. at363.
112. Doughney, 263 F.3d at 363.
113. Seeid
114. Seeid. at367.
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ody." 15 While Doughney contended that the parody message could be found
in the content of the Web site, the court held that the second parody mes-
sage must be delivered simultaneously with the first, i.e., the domain
name.
16
Doughney also claimed that the safe harbor provisions of the ACPA
117
insulated him from liability. 18 However, the court held that because
Doughney knowingly provided false information to NSI, and knew he was
registering a domain name identical to the PETA mark intending to confuse
Internet users, the safe harbor provisions were not applicable." 9
The Fourth Circuit then held that "a bad faith finding under the ACPA
does not compel a finding of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate
behavior under § 1117. "120 The court noted that "[t]he district court was
within its discretion to find that, even though Doughney violated the ACPA
(and, thus, acted in bad faith), he did not act with the level of malicious,
fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior necessary for an award of attor-
ney's fees."'12' The Fourth Circuit, however, stated that establishing "bad
faith" for the purpose of receiving statutory damages under the ACPA is not
necessarily the same "malicious, fraudulent or deliberate behavior" neces-
sary for an award of attorney's fees. 122 The term "exceptional" in the statute
allowing attorney's fees requires a showing of a high degree of culpabil-
ity. 123 Because Doughney had a sincere belief that his Web site was consti-
tutionally protected parody, his culpability was not exceptional.
124
In the first appellate case under the ACPA, Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Market, Inc.,125 the plaintiff operated a mail order catalog
called Sporty's aimed at pilots and aviation enthusiasts. 126 The catalog was
115. Seeid. at366.
116. See id. at 366-67.
117. 15 U.S.C § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000). This provision states that "bad faith intent...
shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person ... had reason-
able grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful."
Id.
118. Doughney, 263 F.3d at 369.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 370.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. See Doughney, 263 F.3d at 370. Another case in accord with Doughney is Mattel,
Inc. v. Antelman, where a district court declined to award attorney's fees against a pro se
defendant who believed his registration of "barbiesbeachwear.com" and "barbiescloth-
ing.com" was a di minimus violation of the ACPA. No. 01 CIV. 8912 (LBS), 2002 WL
113924 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2002). However, the court did award minimum statutory damages
of $2,000 for the defendant's bad faith registration of the two domain names. Id.
125. 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
126. Id. at 493.
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expanded to include tools and home accessories. 127 Defendants operated a
smaller catalog primarily in the field of scientific process measurement and
control instruments. 128 The defendants later decided to expand into the avia-
tion field and registered the name "sportys.com" in 1995.129 A few months
later, defendants formed a subsidiary corporation that operated a Christmas
tree farm under the name "Sporty's Farm.' 130 The "sportys.com" domain
name was transferred to this subsidiary, and a Web site was developed to
promote the Christmas tree farm. 3 1 There was no evidence produced, how-
ever, to show that the defendants intended to create a Christmas tree farm
when the domain name was originally registered. 32 Sportsman's Market
originally brought suit based on federal trademark infringement, dilution
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 133 and the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). 13 4 The trial court held that because the plain-
tiffs and defendants' goods and services were unrelated, there was no
trademark infringement. 135 Then, the trial court rejected the state law claim
under CUTPA because the defendants' behavior was not "immoral, unethi-
cal, oppressive, or unscrupulous[,]" nor did the plaintiff show that it suf-
fered a substantial injury. 136 The trial court did find, however, that the plain-
tiffs mark was famous and distinctive, and therefore, there was dilution of
that mark by defendant's registration of the "sportys.com" domain name.
137
Sporty's Farm appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal, the ACPA
became effective.' 38 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied the ACPA on its own initiative and found that the facts as
developed warranted a finding of bad faith registration under the ACPA.
139
However, the court did not award damages because the acts complained of
occurred before the effective date of the ACPA and because Sporty's
127. Id.
128. See id. at 494.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
132. See id.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
134. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494; CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110(a), to 42-
110(w) (West 2000 & Supp. 2001) (codifying CUTPA).
135. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
136. Id. at 495.
137. Id. at 494-95.
138. Id. at 495.
139. See id. at 498-99. Specifically, the court found that Sporty's Farm (1) used the do-
main name in some commercial fashion; (2) registered the domain name to keep it away
from the plaintiff; and (3) created the Christmas tree farm to protect itself in the event
Sportsman's Market sued for trademark infringement. Id. It also rejected Sporty's Farm's
contention that it adopted the name in good faith in honor of one principle owner's childhood
dog named "Spotty." See id. at 499.
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Farm's behavior did not arise to the level of willfulness required under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act.14
0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
damages under the ACPA may be awarded against cybersquatters who reg-
istered domain names before the effective date of the ACPA, but continued
to use the domain names in connection with infringing Web sites after the
effective date of the ACPA. In Shields v. Zuccarini,14 1 the plaintiff, Shields,
was a computer graphic artist who created famous cult animations such as
"Frog in a Blender," "Micro-Gerbil," and "Live and Let Dive," under the
names "Joe Cartoon" and "The Joe Cartoon Company."'142 Shields licensed
the animations to others for use on collateral products such as clothing,
mugs, and other novelties.1 43 He also had a popular Web site, "joecar-
toon.com," that averaged over 700,000 visitors per month. 44 The defendant,
a notorious cybersquatter, registered five typographical misspellings of the
domain name "joecartoon.com.' ' 45 Zuccarini's Web sites featured adver-
tisements for credit card companies and other Web sites, and his Web site
engaged in the practice of "mousetrapping," a practice whereby the user is
"subjected to a series of advertisements.' 46 To exit the site, the user must
click on the advertisement. In the Shields case, Zuccarini earned between
ten and twenty-five cents for each advertisement clicked upon. 47 Shields
sent cease and desist letters to Zuccarini, which Zuccarini ignored. 48 After
Shields instituted suit, Zuccarini changed the Web sites to say that he had
created a political protest Web site to protest Joe Cartoon's desensitization
of children toward killing animals. 149
The Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that Zuccarini be-
haved in bad faith by registering the domain names.' 50 It also affirmed the
trial court's rejection of Zuccarini's political protest argument and the
140. See id at 500.
141. 254 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 2001).
142. Id. at 479.
143. Id.
144. Id. In his opinion, Judge Aldisert noted that the traffic to the site "increased expo-
nentially" when the site was named "shock site of the day" by Macromedia. Id.
145. Id. Specific domain names involved were "joescartoon.com," "joecarton.com,"
"joescartons.com," "joescartoons.com," and "cartoonjoe.com." Id.
146. Id. at 480.
147. Shields, 254 F.3d at 480.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 486. Zuccarini was found to have no intellectual property rights in the names.
Id. They did not contain any variation of his real name or "any other name commonly used to
identify him." Id. He never used the names "in connection with the bona fide offering of
goods or services." Id. at 485. He also had no "non-commercial or 'fair use"' of the Web site.
Id.
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ACPA's safe harbor 5 ldefense as being "cooked up purely for this suit' 152
As to Zuccarini's claim that the ACPA damage provisions did not apply in
his case because he registered the domain names prior to the effective date
of the ACPA, the Third Circuit held that where the domain name is used in
connection with a Web site after the effective date of the ACPA, statutory
damages may be awarded even if the domain name was originally registered
prior to the enactment of the ACPA. 
5 3
In E & J Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd.,54 Gallo Winery sued Spi-
der Webs, an Internet domain name broker. 55 Spider Webs registered
nearly 2000 domain names, one of which was "emestandjuliogallo.com.'4 56
Spider Webs initially held the domain name without creating a Web site for
the name, but after being sued, Spider Webs developed a Web site which
devoted space to the risks associated with alcohol consumption and alleged
misrepresentations made by corporations in general. 57 The court held that
Spider Webs had registered the domain name "with a bad faith intent to
profit. 1 58 The court ordered a transfer of the domain name and also
awarded statutory damages in the amount of $25,000. 159 Spider Webs con-
tended that because it registered the domain name before the enactment of
the ACPA, damages were not available.' 60 The court noted that because
Spider Webs actually used the domain name after the effective date of the
ACPA, it was subject to the damage provisions. 161
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,162 Lockheed
Martin sued to hold a domain name registry, NSI, liable under the ACPA
for holding the registrations of confusingly similar domain names that had
been registered by cybersquatters. 63 Lockheed Martin owned trademark
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
152. Shields, 254 F.3d at 485 (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 640
(E.D. Pa. 2000)).
153. Id. at 486. In another district court case out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
Zuccarini was assessed the maximum statutory damages of $100,000 times five domain
names ($500,000) plus over $30,000 in attorney's fees based on substantially similar con-
duct. Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (E.D. Pa.
2000). This case was decided after the lower court decision in the Shields case but before the
Third Circuit decision. Id.
154. 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
155. See id. at 1035.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1047.
159. Id. at 1048.
160. E&JGallo Winery, 129 F. Supp. at 1047.
161. Id.
162. 141 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
163. Id. at 649.
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registrations for the marks "Lockheed Martin" and "Skunk Works."' 64 NSI
"screens domain name applications against a registry database of existing"
registrations and "maintains a directory linking, domain names with the
[Internet protocol] numbers of domain name servers." 165 The servers "con-
nect domain names with other Internet computers that host Web sites and e-
mail systems."' 66 NSI did not make independent judgments to determine the
domain name registrant's rights in the domain name, "consult with third
parties" prior to accepting a registration, or "monitor the use of the domain
name once registered."'' 67 In accordance with its agreement with ICANN to
act as an accredited domain name registry, NSI had to "comply with con-
sensus policies adopted by ICANN which" included abiding by the
UDRP.
168
After the enactment of the ACPA, Lockheed Martin filed suit in federal
court alleging that NSI had a bad faith intent to profit from the registration
of domain names by accepting registrations from cybersquatters.169 How-
ever, the court granted NSI's motion for summary judgment holding that
there was "no evidence that defendant is a person that 'registers, traffics in,
or uses a domain name."",
170
The court noted that when Congress enacted the ACPA, it did not in-
tend to make domain name registries "act as gatekeepers to the body of pos-
sible domain names to protect trademark owners."' 17 1 The court said that the
sheer volume of domain name registrations would prevent a registry from
operating if it had to check every domain name against the trademark rights
of others prior to accepting the registration. 72 When the ACPA was en-
acted, a safe harbor provision was written into section thirty-two of the
Lanham Act,1 73 that essentially immunizes domain name registries from the
imposition of damages solely related to the fact that the registry accepted
164. Id. at 650.
165. Id. at 651.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Lockheed Martin, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
169. See id. Interestingly, this was not the first attempt Lockheed Martin made to hold
the deep-pocketed NSI financially liable for accepting the registration of infringing domain
names from cybersquatters. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). Prior to the enactment of the
ACPA, Lockheed Martin unsuccessfully sued NSI alleging trademark infringement, con-
tributory trademark infringement, and trademark dilution for accepting a registration for the
skunkworks.com domain name. See id..
170. Lockheed Martin, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 655 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)
(2000)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(i)(I) (2000).
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for registration a domain name which is found to be confusingly similar or
dilutive of another's trademark. 
174
The lesson of Lockheed Martin is that while it is true that domain name
registrars earn profits from third parties (many of whom are known cyber-
squatters) through the registration fees associated with registering domain
names, income earned solely from the act of maintaining the registry
through fees universally charged to all persons who register domain names
does not subject an accredited domain name registrar to liability under the
ACPA. 175 However, a registry can lose its safe harbor protections if it has
"bad faith intent to profit from such registration and maintenance of the
domain name."'176 Therefore, it will likely take proof that the domain name
registrar itself actively conspired with the cybersquatter, such as a showing
that the registrar received kickbacks or commissions from the sale of do-
main names registered in bad faith by cybersquatters.
Registral.com, L.L. C. v. Fisher Controls International177 illustrates the
crucial importance of a company diligently maintaining its domain names
lest they be snatched away by sophisticated cybersquatters1 78 The case in-
volved the grant of a preliminary injunction brought by Fisher Controls
against Registral.com and an affiliated company, Commbine.com, over the
registration of the "fisher.com" domain name.179 Fisher Controls sold con-
trol valves. °80 The company had manufactured control valves under the
"Fisher" mark since the 1880s.181 It had numerous federal trademark regis-
trations and spent over one million dollars annually in recent years promot-
ing the marks.182 Fisher Controls originally owned the "fisher.com" domain
name, but through an unexplained error, the fee was either not received or
credited by NSI, and the domain name was put on a list of expired domains
that were to be released to the public as available for registration.
83
Commbine.com had a computer software program that searched and identi-
fied expired domain names that alerted the defendants that the "fisher.com"
domain would be made available. 84 Two minutes after the domain name
was released to the public for registration, Registral.com had registered the
"fisher.com" domain name.185
174. Id. § 11 14(2)(D)(ii)(II).
175. See Lockheed Martin, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 648,
176. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(D)(iii).
177. No. H-01-1423, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (mem).
178. See id.
179. Id. at *29.
180. Id. at *2.
181. Id. at *2, para. 1.
182. Id. at *2, para. 3.
183. Registral.com, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002, at *4.
184. Id. at *5, para. 15.
185. Id. at *5, para. 16.
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While the court acknowledged that "Fisher" was a relatively common
surname, 8 6 this fact alone did not immunize the defendants. 187 The court
found that Fisher Controls had acquired distinctiveness in the name through
very long use of the mark in commerce and its extensive advertising and
promotional activities.188 The facts also showed that Registral.com and
Commbine.com were notorious cybersquatters and typosquatters.189 Regis-
tral.com claimed that it was being reverse domain name hijacked' 90 in that it
was intending to create a genealogical research Web site for people with the
"Fisher" surname.' 91 There was no evidence presented, however, that the
defendants intended to create the genealogy Web site when the domain
name was registered. 92 The Web site originally only featured a link to a
search engine. 93 After the institution of the lawsuit, defendants changed the
Web site to include links to another Web site which discussed Fisher Con-
trol's attempt to steal the domain name away from the defendants. 194 It was
also changed to include a brief statement that a "Fisher Family Genealogy
Center" would be coming soon.195 Defendants made no attempt, however, to
hire any employees to develop a genealogy Web site or took any other steps
toward developing or maintaining a Web site. 196 The court rejected this
claim as simply an attempt to anticipate a defense to hide their true inten-
tions to profit from ultimately selling the domain name. 197 Although the
defendants never actually offered to sell the domain name to Fisher Con-
trols, 198 the court held that they had a proven prior track record for register-
186. Id. at* 17.
187. See id. at *8.
188. Id. at *22.
189. Registral.com, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002, at *5-6, *11-12. A "typosquatter" is a
subset of cybersquatter who registers common typographical misspellings of famous trade-
marks. For example, in this case the defendants had registered "ebbay.com" and
"googel.com." Id. at *6. They also had registered "garthbrooks.com," "bluemountains.com"
and "southchina-momingpost.com." Id.
190. Id. at *10. This involves a more well-known, more well-funded entity who attempts
to wrongfully take away a domain name from a person with a legitimate right to use of a
domain name. See supra note 23.
191. Registral.com, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002, at *10.
192. See id. at *10-11.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *10.
195. Id.
196. Id. at *10-11.
197. Registralcom, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002, at *12. The court further observed
that similar statements were made by defendants on the "ebbay.com" and "googel.com" Web
sites they registered; however, the Houston telephone book did not have a single listing for
anybody with the surname of "Ebbay" or "Googel." Id. at *11-12. Nationwide, there were
only two listings for people with "Ebbay" surnames and eight people with "Googel" sur-
names. Id. at *12.
198. Id.
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ing famous marks and attempting to sell them for substantial profits. 199 The
company, in fact, held themselves out to the public as domain name bro-
kers.200 All of these facts, when considered together, demonstrated that the
defendants had "no trademark or other intellectual property rights in the
name 'fisher.com,"' that no one associated with the defendants was named
"Fisher," and that the defendants had neither used the name "in connection
with any bona fide offering of goods and services" nor had "noncommercial
or fair use of the 'Fisher' mark" when the domain name was registered.20'
Of course, Registral.com does not mean that anyone who registers a
common surname as a domain name is automatically a cybersquatter. If the
registrant is actually named "Fisher"20 2 or if the company that registered the
"Fisher" domain name also operated under the mark, such as the manufac-
turer of Fisher snacks and nuts, or if someone were actually planning to
create a Fisher family genealogy Web site, then such a registrant would
more likely be found to be a legitimate user of the domain name. Assuming
that a trademark infringement claim could not be sustained, such as where
the goods and services of the two Fishers are unrelated, then the fact that the
complaining party has longer prior use of the name as a trademark would be
irrelevant in determining who gets to keep the coveted domain name.
Perhaps the biggest lesson to be learned from the Registral.com case is
that diligent attention must be paid to maintaining domain name registra-
tions, such as timely payment of renewal fees, or one risks having the do-
main name snatched away by someone else. The Registral.com case also
illustrates the sophistication of many cybersquatters who use computer pro-
grams specifically designed to hunt down prime domain names that are go-
ing to be re-released for registration to the public, which enables the squat-
ter to register the domain name within a few seconds or minutes of the re-
lease.20 3
3. In Rem Cases Under the ACPA
The ACPA also includes a new method for dealing with cybersquatters
who are either located in foreign countries or who may be located in the
United States but are difficult to find because the cybersquatter used false
contact information in registering the domain name and, thus, cannot be
made subject to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court. This new
method provides that plaintiffs may pursue an in rem action against the do-
199. Id. at'*12-13.
200. Id. at *13, para. 33.
201. Id. at *24-25.
202. The actual names of the principal owners of Registral.com and Commbine.com
were Shunit Sarid and her brother Sahar Sarid. Id. at *4-5, paras. 12-14.
203. See RegistraLcom, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002, at *5.
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main name themselves.204 The following are the elements of in rem proce-
dure: (1) the in rem action must be filed in the "judicial district in which...
the domain name registrar ... is located;, 20 5 (2) the registered domain name
must violate a "right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office or protected under subsection (a) or (c)" of the ACPA;20 6
and (3) the court must find that either the trademark owner "is.not able to
obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have been a de-
fendant in a civil action" under the ACPA 20 7 or the plaintiff has used due
diligence to find the potential defendant, but has not been able to find the
defendant.20 8 To act on due diligence, the plaintiff must first "send a notice
of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under [the ACPA] to the regis-
trant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the
registrant to the registrar., 20 9 Second, the plaintiff must publish the "notice
of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the action., 210 The
only remedy available to a plaintiff in an in rem proceeding is either an or-
der transferring the domain name to the plaintiff or cancellation of the do-
main name.21'
There are a few important points to keep in mind about using the in
rem procedure of the ACPA. First, the in rem and in personam procedures
are not alternative choices left to the discretion of the plaintiff. The in rem
process requires first that the plaintiff use due diligence in attempting to
locate or serve the defendant.212 In the case of foreign based defendants,
courts have held that mere registration of a domain name with a United
States based registry is insufficient to establish the necessary minimum con-
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000).
205. Id. § 1 125(d)(2)(C)(i). Since NSI was the sole registry for many years and is located
in Reston, Virginia, the vast majority of cases filed in rem will be filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, whose reviewing court is the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, most of the developing case law on in rem procedure has
originated from these courts. After domain name registration was expanded to multiple regis-
tries, "register.com" became another popular registry which is located in New York City
making the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York the mandatory
forum for an in rem action involving "register.com" domain names. Before proceeding in
rem, attention must be paid to where the applicable domain name registry is located.
206. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i).
207. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
208. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
209. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II)(aa).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(Il)(bb).
211. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i). Virtually all people who go to the trouble of filing such a
complaint will most likely want the infringing domain names transferred to them rather than
cancelled and made available to a new cybersquatter.
212. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343
(E.D. Va. 2000); Healthmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863
(E.D. Va. 2000).
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tacts with the jurisdiction of the registry required for personal jurisdiction
under the ACPA.213 Therefore, if these are the only facts showing the de-
fendant's contact with the jurisdiction, then this should be enough to satisfy
the due diligence requirement and allow the plaintiff to pursue an in rem
remedy. Next, the in rem procedure cannot be used simply because the
plaintiff does not want to go to the effort of suing a domestic defendant lo-
cated in another state in the defendant's home state. Finally, even if the
plaintiff proceeds in rem, the plaintiff must still demonstrate as a substan-
tive element of its case that the domain name registrant registered the do-
main name in bad faith.214 Proving bad faith against an unknown defendant
may be difficult in some cases. Some courts have noted that if the domain
name registrant has provided false contact information to the registry or has
failed to maintain a current address, then these facts cast doubt on the do-
main name registrant's bona fide reasons for registering the domain name in
the first place.215
4. Simultaneous UDRP and ACPA Actions
When the UDRP became effective there was some question as to
whether a parallel ACPA case could be filed simultaneously. That question
was decided in the affirmative in the case of Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc. 216 In
this case the court held that an accused cybersquatter could bring a declara-
tory judgment action in federal court seeking a declaration that he did not
violate the ACPA even though the trademark owner had already instituted a
UDRP proceeding.21 7 The court said that section three of the UDRP con-
templates parallel litigation and that "nothing in the UDRP restrains either
party from filing suit before, after or during the administrative proceed-ings.28 The effect of this case could allow a trademark owner to file a
UDRP complaint seeking transfer of the domain name in lieu of going
through the expense related to obtaining a preliminary injunction while at
the same time seeking damages under the ACPA. Again, there may be cases
in which a preliminary injunction is a necessity, such as active infringement
or dilution; however, Parisi provides an economical alternative in cases
213. Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 343; Healthmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 863; see
also Cable News Network v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 491 (E.D. Va. 2001);
America Online, Inc. v. Chin-Hsein Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 856 (E.D. Va. 2000).
214. Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 489; Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain
Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 423 (E.D. Va. 2000); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hy-
percd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
215. Jack in the Box, Inc. v. Jackinthebox.org, 143 F. Supp. 2d 590, 591 (E.D. Va. 2001);
Harrods, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 426.
216. 139 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Va. 2001).
217. Id. at 752.
218. ld. at 751.
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where the domain name is simply parked, under construction, or otherwise
not in use.
IV. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE POLICIES CONCERNING THE
REGISTRATION OF DOMAIN NAMES
In many cases, a domain name can also function as a trademark or ser-
vice mark.219 If the owner of the name uses the domain name in a manner
that otherwise functions as a mark, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) will register the mark.220 However, a PTO registration does
not automatically reserve the name on the Internet. Only an authorized do-
main name registry can do that. The PTO policy requires the applicant to
show that it offers services via the Internet, and the applicant must provide
specimens that show use of the domain name as a service mark, rather than
simply as a Universal Resource Locator (URL) or Internet address.221 Sec-
ondly, the information contained on the Web site must not merely advertise
or promote one's own goods or services. 222 The PTO examiner will check
the Web site for this purpose.223 If the Web site does anything other than
promote the company's own goods and services, then PTO registration of
the domain name is possible.224
V. THE FRONTIER: LOOKING AHEAD
A. Use of Generic Terms as Domain Names
Since the implementation of the ACPA and UDRP, many trademark
owners have been using these tools effectively to wrest control of their
marks back from cybersquatters. However, many cybersquatters have come
to learn that some of the more valuable domain name properties are actually
those that are highly descriptive or generic, and there has been a marked
shift toward squatting on such terms, i.e., "www.books.com.,, 225 Therefore,
having control of generic or highly descriptive words as a domain name has
219. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXAMINATION GUIDE
No. 2-99, MARKS COMPOSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, OF DOMAIN NAMES pt. II.A. (1999),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide299.htm [hereinafter EXAM-
INATION GUIDE].
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at pt. II.B.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Greg Johnson, The Costly Game for Net Names, L.A. TIMES., Apr. 10, 2000, at
At.
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become the virtual world's version of a hot property.226 Internet users often
use simple, generic words to search for a site and are more familiar with
common words.227 Start-up companies seeking to build a dominant Internet
presence would more likely find that having a simple, highly descriptive
domain name which immediately tells the consumer what the service is
about is much better than spending the millions of dollars it would take to
brand a more distinctive term. 2
Further, generic and highly descriptive domain names are virtually
immune from attack under trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and
ACPA claims, as well as the UDRP because one of the necessary elements
of a case is that the complainant have trademark rights in the term. 229 Unless
a descriptive term has acquired distinctiveness through long use and wide-
spread advertising and promotion, the mark is not protectable.230 If the term
is generic, then no amount of advertising, promotion, or use could convert
the generic term into a protectable mark.23'
The above factors combine to create a market where many companies
are willing to pay premium prices for generic terms, and cybersquatters or
"domain name brokers" are cashing in.232 With the increase in demand for
generic or highly descriptive domain names, the monetary value of such
domain names have skyrocketed.233 For example, the domain name
"sex.com" has been estimated to be worth $250 million.234 Other owners of
226. See id
227. Wendy R. Leibowitz, Going Once, Going Twice--Sold! Domain Name Market
Heats Up, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 28, 1998, at B6.
228. See id
229. See, e.g., Healy v. Kuhlen, No. D2000-0698 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000),
available at http://arbitr.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htm/2000/d2000-0698.html (finding no
bad faith where the domain name registered was "dvdnews.com" and the facts showed that
the mark was very descriptive, if not generic, for a publication providing news and informa-
tion about digital video discs (DVD), and the domain name registrant registered the domain
name long before the trademark owner even filed its application for trademark registration);
ETAX Corp. v. Whiting, Nos. AF-0369a, AF-0369b (eResolution Consortium 2000), avail-
able at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions/0369.htm (finding that the registra-
tion of domain names "etax.com" and "etax.net" was not in bad faith because the complain-
ant failed to establish that it had rights in the alleged mark "etax" for electronic tax prepara-
tion and filing services and because the term was sufficiently descriptive or generic for the
service).
230. Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1983).
231. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing, Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79-80 (7th Cir.
1977); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
232. See Lebowitz, supra note 227, at B6.
233. See Nick Wingfield, The Game of the Name: Thinking up the Perfect Address Cru-
cial; Just Hope Nobody Else Owns It, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at R14 (reporting that
"bingo.com" sold for $1.1 million, "drugs.com" for $823,456, and "university.com" for
$530,000).
234. Jon Swartz, Sex.com Ownership Ruling Expected; Domain Name Hotly Disputed,
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generic or descriptive domain names are now cashing in on the demand for
the domain names as well. The "business.com" domain name was sold for
$7.5 million,235 the "loans.com" domain name sold for over $3.0 million,236
and "flu.com" for $1.4 million.237
1. Trademark Registration of "e" and "i" Domain Name/Service
Marks
It is well settled that merely descriptive marks may be protectable but
only with a showing of "acquired distinctiveness. 238 Likewise, registration
of a merely descriptive mark with the PTO requires a showing of "acquired
distinctiveness. '239 Some trademark applicants have tried to overcome this
statutory prohibition by adding the letter "e" or "i" in front of the descrip-
tive or generic term, e.g., "i-books.com," or "eautos.com., 240 Until recently,
such marks were routinely registered by the PTO because it was viewed that
the "e" or "i" letter designation moved the descriptive term across the
amorphous suggestive line and, thus, became immediately registrable with-
out proof of acquired distinctiveness. 241 However, a series of cases from the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has reversed that trend.242 It is currently
well settled that registrability will be judged solely on the strength of the
term that follows the letter.243 If the term is generic, it is not registrable on
• "244
either the principal or supplemental registers--ever.2 If the term is merely
USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2000, at 3B.
235. Johnson, supra note 225, at Al.
236. Bank of America Was Winning Bidder of Loans.corn Web Domain, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 2000, at B 15 (reporting Bank of America Corp. bought "Loans.com" for $3 million at
an auction sale held by GreatDomains.com).
237. Mark Ribbing, Local Firm Seeks Profit in Sale of Dot-Corn Name; By One Valua-
tion, It Could Bringfrom $5,000 to $5 million, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 23, 2000, at 1C.
238. Zatarain's Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 794 (5th Cir. 1983).
239. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000).
240. Johnson, supra note 225, at Al.
241. Zatarain's, 698 F.2d at 791.
242. See In re Zanova, Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd.
Apr. 30, 2001) (finding that the mark "iTOOL" is merely descriptive for a Web site and
software for use in creating Internet web pages and that "i" has become commonly under-
stood to be a reference to "[I]nternet"); In re Styleclick.com, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445
(Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. Nov. 29, 2000) (holding that "E Fashion" is merely descrip-
tive for a Web site and computer software providing beauty and fashion advice); Cont'l
Airlines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Trademark Trial &
Appeal Bd. Dec. 29, 1999) (holding that the domain name "e-ticket" is generic for electronic
airline ticketing; "e" has become commonly understood to mean "electronic").
243. See In re Zanova, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300; In re Styleclick.com, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445; Cont'lAirlines, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2000); PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(c); see also Cont'l
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descriptive, then a showing of acquired distinctiveness is required for prin-
cipal registration.245 If the descriptive term is capable of acquiring distinct-
iveness but has not yet done so, then the mark may be registered on the sup-
plemental register.246 In many cases, the descriptive "e" or "i" mark is filed
based on intent to use or use with only a very short time of actual use before
the trademark application is filed.247 In such cases, it will be very difficult, if
not impossible, to produce the necessary evidence to prove acquired dis-
tinctiveness in a descriptive mark.
2. UDRP Treatment of "e" and "i" Domain Name Disputes
While it is not impossible for the owners of a descriptive domain name
to win a UDRP case, such complainants have their work cut out for them. A
Dallas based company, EAuto, Inc., has had mixed results when using the
UDRP to enforce its rights regarding the domain name
"www.eauto.com.,, 248 In one case, EAuto was successful in its UDRP case
against a domain name broker who registered "e-auto-parts.com. 249 The
domain name broker had registered the domain name and immediately
placed it for sale to the highest bidder. 250 In response to a cease and desist
letter from EAuto, the domain name registrant asked for $4750 to transfer
the domain name. 251 The domain name registrant also owned about 4000
other domain names, and it never attempted to commercially develop the
Web site on its own.252 The WIPO panelist found that EAuto's federally
registered trademark was presumed to be distinctive, 23 and the domain
name registrant had a specific intent to profit from the registration of the
domain name, had no other legitimate rights in the mark, and had failed to
respond to the UDRP complaint. 4 Under these circumstances, WIPO held
that the domain name was registered in bad faith.255 However, EAuto was
Airlines, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2000).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 1091.
247. See EXAMINATION GUIDE, supra note 219, pt. II.E.
248. See EAuto, Inc., No. D2000-0120 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. 2000), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/ domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0120.html.
249. Id. para. 7.
250. Id. para. 4.
251. Id. para. 15. The registrant claimed the amount was its out of pocket costs related to
its purported domain name research, registration expenses, and legal fees. Id
252. Id. para. 17.
253. Id. EAuto registered its mark in 1997 for "providing multiple user access to a global
computer network." Thus, this is an example of a pre-Continental Airlines case where the
PTO allowed the registration of the "e" mark without a showing of acquired distinctiveness.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2000).
254. Eauto, No. D2000-0120, para. 6.
255. Id. para. 21.
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not successful in two other UDRP cases involving the domain names
"eautolamps.com ' '256 and "eautoinc.com." 257 In both of these cases, the do-
main name registrants had developed Web sites in connection with selling
auto parts via the Internet,258 and, in one case, the registrant actually had
used the wording as a trade name for many years. 9
B. Uncharted Territories
Like Lewis and Clark who ventured off to explore the vast unknown of
the Pacific Northwest, new issues loom on the horizon in cyberspace law
that have yet to be fully explored. While the following matters do not neces-
sarily involve Internet domain names per se, they present new and novel
legal issues that are not clearly defined and may take a few more years to
get clear guidance from the courts.
1. Gatoring
One such issue looming on the horizon involves a concept which some
have dubbed "gatoring." Gator, a computer software company, originally
developed software designed to help computer users manage passwords and
user identifications.26 ° It has millions of active users and offers free
downloads over the Internet.261
However, Gator also developed software that allows an advertiser to
effectively place a banner ad exactly over another banner ad on a Web site
when someone has downloaded the Gator program on his or her com-
puter.262 The advertising software is typically bundled with password man-
agement software and downloaded at the same time the password manage-
ment software is loaded onto a consumer's computer.263 As an example of
how the Gator software works, if a Web site contains a banner advertise-
ment for Company XXX, and its competitor, Company ZZZ purchases
keywords from Gator, many of which involve trademarks of various com-
256. EAuto, Inc. v. Triple S Auto Parts, No. D2000-0047 (World Intellectual Prop. Org.
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0047.html.
257. EAuto, Inc. v. E Auto Parts, Inc., No. D2000-0121 (World Intellectual Prop. Org.
2000), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0047.html.
258. E Auto Parts, No. D2000-0121, para. 4; Triple S Auto Parts, No. D2000-0047, para.
3.
259. E Auto Parts, No. D2000-0121, para. 19.
260. Gator is in the business of creating and selling pop-up advertisements for Internet
Web sites. See Stefanie Olsen, Gator Chomps on Innocent Banner Ads, ZDNET NEWS, Aug.
17, 2001, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1106-27115.html.
261. Id. paras. 6, 9.
262. Id. para. 9.
263. Id.
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panies, the Gator software will place a banner advertisement for Company
ZZZ directly over the Company XXX banner ad so that the computer user
may not even realize that the Company ZZZ banner ad is obscuring the
Company XXX banner ad.a6
Furthermore, the Gator software can track the viewing habits of the
computer user and adjust the banner advertising accordingly.265 For exam-
ple, if someone visited an automobile manufacturer's Web site one day, the
Gator software could place a pop-up banner ad for a company selling car
insurance or even a competing car manufacturer when the computer user
surfs to a Web site that features banner advertising, even if the Web site
itself is wholly unrelated to cars or insurance.266 The practice has raised
difficult and largely unsettled questions of law.267 Gator officials contend
that there is nothing wrong with the practice of bundling its special banner
ad software with its password management software because the consumers
agree to the practice when they install the software on their computer.
268
Further, Gator argues that consumers can move its banners to reveal the
underlying ad or close the Gator ad by clicking an "X" in the comer and
revealing the original Web site ad.269 However, some have criticized Gator's
allegations regarding consumer consent because the consent information is
often buried in fine print in lengthy license agreements that require the con-
sumer to wade through and then click to accept or decline.270
The issues raised by the Gator software are not too unlike the practice
of meta tagging,271 which some courts have already found to run afoul of
trademark and unfair competition law in certain circumstances,272 and fram-
ing,273 which in some instances violates copyright law274 and has the poten-
264. Id. para. 10.
265. Id. para. 3.
266. Olsen, supra note 260, para. 4.
267. See id.
268. Id. para. 22.
269. Id.
270. Id. para. 34.
271. Meta tags provide information about a Web site page such as "who created the page,
how often it is updated, what the page is about and which keywords represent the page's
content." Webopedia, Meta tag, at http://www.webopedia.comfTERM/m/ meta tag.html
(last visited May 28, 2002). Many search engines use meta tags in building an index of
search results. Id. Meta tags are invisible to computer users, but can be revealed in Microsoft
Internet Explorer by going into "View" and clicking on the subheading called "Source" or
"Page Source."
272. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d
1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834 (S.D. Ind.
2000), affid, 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000); N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v.
Eric Louis Assoc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Playboy Enters. v. Calvin Designer
Label, 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
273. Framing is a type of link; however, instead of sending the computer user away or
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tial for causing confusion.2 75 On the other hand, the issue is not unlike the
practice of some search engines selling trademarks as keywords27 6 to Inter-
net advertisers, which at least one district court has held did not violate the
trademark rights of a trademark owner.277
2. New gTLD Land Rush
In November 2000 ICANN approved of adding seven new global Top
Level Domains (gTLDs) to allow more people, businesses, institutions, and
organizations an opportunity to register a domain name that may have been
shut out as the ".com," ".net," and ".org" gTLDs have filled up. 278 The new
gTLDs are: ".info," ".biz," ".name," ".pro," ".aero," ".museum," and
".coop. ' '279 Of the seven, only ".info" is a truly unrestricted domain.280
Those who register a ".info" domain name can use it for any purpose.28' The
rest are restricted for specific purposes.282 The new ".biz" domain is re-
283 "n
stricted for purely business and commercial purposes. The ".name" is
out from the linking Web site, the framing Web site brings information from another Web
site in to the user of its Web site. Webopedia, Frames, at http:// webope-
dia.Internet.com/TERM/f/frames.html (last visited May 28, 2002). Often times the new Web
site is surrounded by a frame so that the user of the Web site is still looking at the original
Web site, but the information within the frame is being imported from some other site. Id.
274. Futuredontics v. Applied Anagramatics, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
275. See THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETmON § 25.70, at 25-157 (4th ed. 2001).
276. In "database management systems, a keyword is an index entry that identifies a
specific record or document." Webopedia, Keyword, at http://www.webopedia.
com/TERM/k/keyword.html (last visited.May 28, 2002).
277. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., Nos. SACV 99-320,
SACV 99-321, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13418 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (fimding that Excite search
engine's practice of selling famous Playboy trademarks to competitors of Playboy for use in
connection with placing banner ads on Web sites did not infringe or dilute Playboy's trade-
mark rights).
278. ICANN, New TLD Program, at http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last updated May 12,
2002) [hereinafter New Program].
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. Seeid.
282. See id.
283. See id. The rules related to ".biz" registrations state that the domain name must be
used for the purposes of exchanging "goods, services or property of any kind" and used in
the ordinary course of trade or business of a business, such as advertising. NeuLevel, Inc.,
Agreement Restrictions and Dispute Policies, at http://www.neulevel.biz/ count-
down/registrationrestrictions.html (last visited November 1, 2001). Registering the domain
name solely for the purpose of "selling, trading or leasing the domain name for compensa-
tion, or the unsolicited offering to sell, trade, or lease the domain name for compensation,"
which is essentially the definition of cybersquatting, shall not be deemed to be a business or
commercial use of the domain name. Id. Likewise using a ".biz" designation exclusively for
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designed specifically for the registration of personal names, including fic-
tional characters, i.e., "harrypotter.name. '2 84 The ".pro" domain is limited to
use by professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and accountants.2 85 The
".museum" domain, as the name suggests, is specifically for the operators of
museums. 86 The ".coop" domain is for cooperatives,287 and the ".aero" do-
main is limited to the air transportation industry. 88
3. The Power. biz?
NueLevel, Inc., the operator of the ".biz" top level domain, recognized
that there may be multiple businesses that use the same or highly similar
trademarks. 89 It devised a method where such businesses could file a claim
to a specific domain name prior to the release of the gTLD to the public at
large.2 90 All a business had to do was claim that it had common law rights in
the mark.29' Federal registration was not required.292 The business could
also file multiple claims for a domain name for a nonrefundable two dollar
processing fee.293 In the event there were conflicting claims for the same
domain name, a random drawing would be held among those who filed
claims, but those who filed multiple claims would receive higher odds of
being selected.294
A lawsuit claiming that the system constituted an illegal lottery under
California law was filed in August 2001 against NeuLevel and ICANN.2 95
In October 2001 a state court judge in Los Angeles, California, issued a
preliminary order staying the issuance of ".biz" domain names worldwide
that had conflicting claims to the name, pending the ultimate decision as to
personal or noncommercial use or for criticizing the products or services of another, such as
registering a "xxxcompanysucks.biz," with no other intended business or commercial pur-
pose shall also not constitute a bona fide business or commercial use. See id.
284. .Name, Email & Web Address for Life, at http://www.nic.name/consumer/index.
html (last visited June 25, 2002); New Program, supra note 278.
285. See New Program, supra note 278.
286. See id
287. See id
288. See id.
289. See NueLevel, Inc., .BIZ Services, at http://w: 'v.neulevel.biz/services/index.html
(last visited May 28, 2002).
290. See id.; NeuLevel, Inc., Start-up Trademark Opposition Policy and Rules for .BIZ,
at http://www.neulevel.biz/ardp/docs/stop.html (May 11, 2001).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Gwendolyn Mariano, Judge Puts Breaks on .BIZ Addresses, CDNETNEWS.COM,
Oct. 12, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-274367.html?legacy=cnet.
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whether the system violated California lottery law.296 In December 2001
NeuLevel announced that it would abandon the random drawing in favor of
a round robin type of selection from the various domain name registries.297
Each domain name would be awarded to an applicant of the registry in
turn.298 If a registry submits an application for a domain name that has al-
ready been awarded, the registry will lose its turn in that round and will not
be able to submit an alternative selection during that particular round.2 99
Further, the two dollar processing fee originally charged each applicant for
a contested domain name will be refunded to all that paid it except to the
applicant who actually obtains the contested domain name.
300
4. Internet Encroachment in Franchise Systems
Finally, another new and largely uncharted area of law involves the
concept of Internet encroachment in the context of franchise business sys-
tems. Internet encroachment occurs when a franchiser, who has granted
exclusive trade territories to franchisees, develops an electronic commerce
Web site for the direct sale and distribution of goods through the fran-
chiser's Web site. Because the Internet has no geographic boundaries, the
franchiser could, in effect, sell products to consumers who live within the
exclusive trade area of another franchisee, thus taking away a sale that
might have been made in the franchisee's store and overall reducing the
value of the exclusive trade area to the franchisee. Similarly, franchisee to
franchisee encroachment can occur when a franchisee establishes his or her
own Web site and makes sales of goods and services through the Web site
to consumers who may live within an exclusive territory of another franchi-
see.
Since many franchise agreements provide for mandatory arbitration in
any dispute between franchisees and franchisers, the subject does not come
296. Id. para. 13. Of the 1.2 million applications filed during the pre-registration process,
about 40,000, or less than twenty percent, had conflicting claims. NeuLevel and ICANN
issued formal statements after the preliminary ruling expressing disappointment with the
decision. See id. ICANN's statement expressed concern that the California state court over-
stepped its bounds by holding that the drawing could not be held in cases where both claim-
ants were non-California residents and for applications submitted to registrars that have no
connection with California. See id. ICANN further warned that the decision would be "harm-
ful to the evolution of the global Internet." See id. NeuLevel's statement is available at
http://neulevel.biz/press/press_ release/ prarchive_2000_2001/2001.10.11.html (Oct. 11,
2001); ICANN's statement is found at http://icann.org/announcements/advisory-12octOl.htm
(Oct. 12, 2001).
297. Reuters, Registry to Return Fees for .BIZ Domains, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Dec.
17, 2001, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-277133.html?legacy-cnet.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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up frequently in published court cases. However, a few recent arbitration
cases have shed some insight into the concept of Internet encroachment.
In Emporium Drug Mart, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,3°1 the fran-
chiser, Drug Emporium, had created an Internet Web site that sold products
directly to the consumer regardless of the consumer's location and some-
times at prices that were less than could be found at a brick and mortar
store.3°2 It also had a network of franchised stores with exclusive trade ar-
eas. 30 3 Some franchisees objected to the Internet Web site as being a viola-
tion of the franchise agreement.3 4 Drug Emporium's franchise agreements
did not expressly reserve to the franchiser the right to develop alternative
means of distribution.30 5 A divided three member panel held for the franchi-
sees and found that Drug Emporium's Web site was an encroachment into
the exclusive trade areas of the franchisees.30 6 On the other hand, an arbitra-
tor in a similar case in California recently ruled that where a franchise
agreement did reserve unto the franchiser the unrestricted right to develop
other businesses or distribution systems and to use its marks in connection
therewith, there was no breach of the franchisee agreement when the fran-
chiser began selling flowers through an Internet Web site to consumers in a
specifically defined exclusive trade area of a franchisee's store.307
The main lesson to be learned from these cases is that franchise agree-
ments drafted some time ago may not have been drafted with Internet e-
commerce in mind. As a result, a franchiser must make a careful review of
its agreements before jumping into developing and operating e-commerce
Web sites. For newer franchise systems, the agreements must now take the
Internet into consideration and carefully and clearly specify what activities
the franchiser and franchisee may take in connection with operating Internet
Web sites including the use and registration of Internet domain names by
franchisees.30 8
301. [2000-2001 Transfer Binder] Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) 11, 966 (Sept. 2, 2000).
302. Id. 11,967.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Hale v. Conroy's Inc., Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Servs. (2001) (Martin, Arb.)
(unpublished decision, on file with the Los Angeles office of the Judicial Arbitration and
Mediation Services).
308. There are numerous other issues related to the Internet and franchised business
systems that are complex and beyond the intended scope of this article, but also deserving of
discussion and attention. For a good discussion of the issues, see N. Michael Garner, Drug
Emporium: The Reality of the Virtual, 20 FRANCHISE L.J. 101 (2001), which contains a very
thorough discussion and analysis of Internet encroachment and other Internet related issues
as they apply to franchisers and franchisees.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The ACPA and the UDRP have become welcome additions for trade-
mark owners and individuals seeking to regain control over the use of their
marks and names from those who seek to get rich from domain name specu-
lation. However, the key distinction that makes ACPA and UDRP cases
different from traditional trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and
unfair competition law is the bad faith intent requirement to profit from the
domain name registration. Plaintiffs must show that the defendant had no
legitimate preexisting right to use the domain name that was registered. If
the defendant domain name registrant can show that it had a legitimate in-
terest in registering the domain name, there is no violation of either the
ACPA or the UDRP.
Proving bad faith intent may be difficult in some cases as cybersquat-
ters are becoming more sophisticated in the law, and some cybersquatters
may be difficult to find. This puts a premium on the part of trademark own-
ers to obtain as much proof as possible that is relevant to the bad faith fac-
tors under either the UDRP or ACPA. Web sites can be changed in a matter
of minutes, particularly in response to cease and desist letters, e-mails, and
phone calls. Many domain name pirates will do so and deny that the plain-
tiff has any proof related to the domain name registrant's bad faith. Since
discovery is not possible with UDRP complaints, complainants must gather
as much documentary proof before filing the complaint. It is becoming
abundantly clear that UDRP panels will not fill in holes in a complainant's
bad faith claim by mere conjecture or speculation. It is equally unlikely that
a court will do so under the ACPA.
It is also becoming more evident that generic and descriptive domain
names are commanding high prices from domain name brokers and specula-
tors. These terms are virtually immune from claims of trademark infringe-
ment, dilution, and charges of bad faith registration under either the ACPA
or the UDRP. Companies who adopt such highly descriptive marks must be
made fully aware that such terms may be difficult to enforce against third
parties. If they find that a highly similar or identical descriptive or generic
domain name is already registered, they may have no choice but to get out
the checkbook and pay the going price if they want the domain name. Fur-
thermore, while it may be fashionable to add the letter "e" or "i" to a de-
scriptive domain name to present a high tech, Internet based business im-
pression, such additions will not magically transform a descriptive or ge-
neric term into a suggestive or distinctive one that can be registered as a
trademark or easily enforced against users of other similar, but equally de-
scriptive, domain names.3 °9
309. See supra Part V.1-2.
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The virtual "Wild, Wild West" is still a little rough and tumble, but the
addition of the ACPA and UDRP is beginning to bring some semblance of
order to the cyberfrontier. As Internet and computer technology continue to
change and evolve, more novel legal issues are likely to be discovered.
